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In the now turbulent field of health care, the nations hos-
pitals are building a variety of multiorganizational arrangements (Fottler,
Schermerhom, Wong, and Money 1982; Provan 1984). One important
form of multiorganizational collaboration is the hospital alliance or
federation.
Federations consist of three or more organizations that pool re-
sources to achieve stated objectives. A distinctive feature of federations
is that a management group or organization coordinates and, to some
extent, directs their activities (Provan 1983). Federations appear to hold
important advantages for their members. Unlike mergers and many joint
ventures, for example, federations involve no change in the corporate
ownership of firms. As a result, federations are easier both to enter and
to exit. This may be one reason that at least one dozen multistate hospital
federations, including over 1,4fl0 members, have emerged since the late
1970s (American Hospital Association 1986). Indeed, approximately 25
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percent of the nations hospitals are members of federations, and the num-
ber appears to be growing steadily. Moreover, because a member of a
hospital federation has a significant share of most major markets for
health care, the behavior of hospital federations can have a substantial
impact on the health care industry in the United States.
’ 
An example of a prominent hospital federation is the Voluntary Hos-
pitals of America (VHA), formed by 30 hospitals in 1977. Today, VHA
has 600 members spanning 40 states, with 160,000 hospital beds. The
member hospitals are geographically dispersed and retain their status as
independent firms, but they work together to achieve economies of scale
(e.g., purchasing supplies), to develop new services (e.g., health main-
tenance organizations), and to provide management services (e.g., man-
agement information systems).
’ 
Hospital federations such as VHA should be examined for several
reasons. First, given the growth of federations, knowledge of their be-
havior is becoming increasingly important, not only for hospital admin-
istrators but also for managers of organizations that interact with hospitals.
Second, hospital federations may increase the concentration of health care
resources, raising questions for policy makers about the effects of feder-
ations on the cost and quality of health care and on access to health care.
Finally, hospital federations are of interest to researchers and theorists
concerned with such organizational adaptation to environmental change
as is now occurring in health care, banking, transportation, and com-
munications. Hospital federations exemplify organizational strategies that
involve cooperation rather than competition (Herriott 1986).
Previous research on organizational federations has drawn heavily
from a single conceptual perspective in_organization theory-the resource
exchange and dependence perspective (D’Aunno and Zuckerman 1987;
Pfeffer and Leong 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Provan 1982; 1983;
1984; Provan, Beyer, and Kruytbosch 1980). This work has examined
factors that facilitate the emergence of federations and factors that influ-
ence the autonomy of organizations in federations.
Though previous work on federations is useful, it has rarely adopted
conceptual perspectives other than a resource dependence perspective.
Yet, in our view, a resource dependence perspective offers only a partial
explanation for the emergence of hospital federations. Thus, the primary
purpose of this article is to stimulate research on, and to advance under-
standing of, the emergence of hospital federations by examining them
from multiple conceptual perspectives. Specifically, we will develop hy-
potheses from a resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978), a transaction cost perspective (Williamson 1975; 1981); an institu-
tional perspective (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983),
325
and a population ecology perspective (Aldrich 1979; Hannan and Free-
man 1977; 1984; McKelvey 1982; McKelvey and Aldrich 1983). Our ob-
jective is to draw from major perspectives on organization-environment
relations to advance a set of hypotheses concerning why hospitals form
federations.
. A second purpose is to show how current perspectives on organi-
zation-environment relations may be usefully integrated in the study of
a complex phenomenon such as the emergence of organizational federa-
tions. Though each perspective provides a unique viewpoint, only when
the perspectives are integrated is their potential for contributing to knowl-
edge of organizational federations fully realized.
DEFINING AND DISTINGUISHING
ORGANIZATIONAL FEDERATIONS
D’Aunno and Zuckerman (1987) and Provan (1984) have defined
organizational federations and distinguished them from other kinds of
multiorganizational arrangement. Federations consist of three or more
organizations that retain their status as independent firms and, at the
same time, intentionally pool resources (e.g., information, funds, person-
nel) to achieve stated objectives (Provan 1983; 1984). Depending on the
objectives of federations, they may exist for months or years, but they are
not necessarily permanent arrangements. Further, the members of fed-
erations relinquish at least some control of their activities to a manage-
ment group or organization whose ostensible objective is to help members
attain the goals of the federation (Provan 1983). The National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) and the United Way are well-known
federations.
Three features distinguish federations. First, the members of fed-
erations set criteria for membership and can exclude organizations that
do not meet the criteria. The selective membership of hospital federations
typically differentiates them from trade associations (e.g., American Hos-
pital Association). Trade associations have historically encouraged the
participation of all organizations in a field or industry in an effort to
promote the interests of the entire industry (see, for example, Duncan
1948). Hospital federations, because of their selective membership, tend
to have far fewer members.
Second, federations involve more than two organizations. They are
thus different from, and more complex than, mergers and joint ventures,
which link two organizations. Third, federation activities are guided by
a management group, a feature that sets federations apart from other
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forms of multiorganizational collaboration, such as coalitions (e.g., Gray
1985).
Of course, the power of management groups to coordinate the be-
havior of member organizations varies widely. The NCAA, for example,
was founded in 1906, but member colleges and universities did not grant
it the right to control athletic programs through rules and sanctions until
1952 (Stem 1979). Organizational participation in the United Way is vol-
untary and involves a quid pro quo arrangement; for its participation an
agency receives from the United Way an allocation from the money raised
during an annual campaign. In return, a member agency cannot solicit
donations from individuals and must meet United Way budgeting re-
quirements. However, a member organization can raise funds from other
sources including foundations, sales, and local or state governments (Pfef-
fer and Leong 1977).
The NCAA, the United Way, and hospital federations are examples
of what Provan (1983) terms voluntary federations. Member organizations
can, in principle, choose to leave voluntary federations. In mandated fed-
erations, the management group controls affiliated organizations either
by law or by strong external pressure, so that members are forced to
participate in the federation and must pay high costs for exit. Typically,
for example, a professional sports team or franchise must comply with





A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE
The resource dependence perspective (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Pfef-
fer and Salancik 1978) argues that organizations respond to the demands
of groups and organizations in their environment on whom they depend
for valued and scarce resources (e.g., technology, funds, personnel). The
dependence perspective, however, also assumes that organizations do not
passively comply with demands from their environments. Rather, it as-
sumes that administrators attempt to manage dependencies both to en-
sure the acquisition of key resources and, hence, organizational survival,
and to maintain their own autonomy which, in turn, allows adaptation
to new contingencies. Hospitals, for example, can reduce dependence on
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outpatient clinics for referrals by purchasing such clinics or founding their
own clinics.
The resource dependence perspective argues that an important, if
not necessary, condition for an organization to pursue a strategy such as
federation building is the organizations dependence on at least one actor
in its environment for valued resources (Litwak and Hylton 1962; Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978; Provan 1983). Resource dependence motivates man-
agers to seek ways to alter or lessen their dependence, particularly if the
supplier of a valued resource is unreliable or makes unreasonable de-
mands. The likelihood that hospitals will pursue such strategies as fed-
eration building increases when actors on whom they are dependent
threaten to withdraw valued resources or behave in a manner that intro-
duces uncertainty. Federal and state legislative bodies, for example, cur-
rently both create uncertainty and threaten hospital resources by
contemplating and passing legislation to control the costs of health care.
In response, it appears, hospital federations have formed to lobby in
Washington and in state capitals. Thus, a resource dependence perspec-
tive on the emergence of hospital federations suggests the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Hospitals are more likely to pursue such strategies as
federation building when they are dependent on actors for valued
resources than when they are relatively independent of suppliers of
resources.
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood increases that hospitals will pursue
such strategies as federation building when actors on whom they
are dependent threaten to withdraw valued resources or behave in
a manner that introduces great uncertainty.
However, organizations can reduce or manage dependence problems
in several ways, including joint ventures (Pfeffer and Nowack 1976),
mergers (Pfeffer 1972a), and interlocking boards of directors (Pfeffer 1972b;
1973). Why would organizations form federations to deal with resource
dependence rather than pursue some other strategy?
One answer is that, relative to other available strategies to deal with
resource dependence, federations are typically less costly in terms of man-
agerial autonomy. A second answer is that federations (as opposed to, for
instance, mergers or joint ventures) enable individual firms to band to-
gether and act as one, thus increasing their power in exchanges with
suppliers of valued resources. By banding together, organizations can
increase their size and strength or at least create an impression of size
and strength. They concentrate their resources or appear to concentrate
them and in so doing can more effectively bargain for their point of view
with groups in the environment.
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A third answer is that federations, in comparison with loose coali-
tions of firms, have the advantage of a management group that can act
to facilitate the development of positions on issues confronting member
organizations and then to lobby for such positions. In fact, lack of man-
agement group may motivate coalitions to become federations (D’Aunno
and Zuckerman 1987). Federations have fewer and less diverse members
than trade associations, so it is easier to build consensus among them
concerning lobbying efforts.
The foregoing arguments suggest:
Hypothesis 3: Federation building is likely to be the strategy of
choice to the extent that hospitals can maintain their autonomy and
yet appear to concentrate their resources.
A fourth answer is that federations unite organizations that share
material interests. Hospitals that are geographically dispersed and yet are
similar in terms of the services they offer or the type of community in
which they are located are likely to face similar patterns of resource de-
pendence and, as a result, have similar problems to solve. For example,
a federation has been formed among 40 university hospitals from across
the United States.
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood that hospitals will form federations
increases to the extent that they face similar patterns of resource
dependence. I
Finally, the extent to which potential members relate to each other
symbiotically rather than competitively (Hawley 1950; Pfeffer and Sal-
ancik 1978) may influence the emergence of hospital federations. In a
symbiotic relationship, one actor uses some of another actors resources
or products. A community hospital and a university hospital may main-
tain a symbiotic relationship. The university hospital may welcome the
community hospitals referrals for tertiary care because the university hos-
pital needs such cases for teaching and research. On the other hand, the
community hospital benefits from the expertise and status it receives
from an affiliation with a university hospital. Further, the community
hospital can benefit financially from referring costly tertiary care cases to
the university hospital.
. Of course, organizations often relate to each other both symbioti-
cally and competitively. They may compete with each other for certain
resources (e.g., patients) but not for others (e.g., technology). Nonethe-
less, a high degree of symbiosis among organizations facilitates the emer-
gence of federations because each organization has an interest in the
effectiveness and survival of the others.
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The members of a hospital federation in Rochester, New York relate
to each other both competitively and symbiotically (Block, Regenstreif,
and Shute 1981; Georgopoulos, D’Aunno, and Saavedra 1987). In 1978,
nine hospitals in the Rochester area formed a federation to address finan-
cial problems. Because the hospitals are located in the same geographic
area they often compete with each other for referrals of patients, but they
do not provide the same services (e.g., a university hospital and a county
hospital for the elderly are members of the federation) and they also relate
to each other symbiotically.
Symbiotic relationships among organizations help them to recog-
nize that cooperative, federational activities can either replace or exist
simultaneously with competitive activities. The NCAA and the United
Way allow their members to balance competition and cooperation. The
United Way eliminates competition among members for local donations
but permits members to compete with each other for state or federal
funds. United Way members are related symbiotically in that they often
refer clients to each other for particular services. In forming federations,
organizations create safety zones for themselves in which competition for
certain resources is at least temporarily halted or reduced. Symbiotic
exchanges among organizations promote the awareness that such safety
zones can be useful and even necessary. Thus:
Hypothesis 5: Hospitals that are symbiotically linked acquire valued
resources from each other, are more likely to be aware of the benefits
of collaboration, and thus are more likely to form federations than
hospitals that relate to each other only competitively.
However, it is important to point out that most hospital federations
do not have members located in the same geographic area. This suggests
that it is easier to reach cooperative agreements when hospitals do not
compete with one another. When hospitals are located in the same area,
the emergence of federations is facilitated to the extent that the hospitals
have symbiotic ties, which can promote cooperation even among com-
petitors, as is the case in Rochester.
TRANSACTION COSTS AND
HOSPITAL FEDERATIONS
. The transaction cost perspective (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975; 1981;
Williamson and Ouchi 1981; Ouchi 1980) has drawn considerable atten-
tion from organizational theorists over the past few years (for critical
reviews, see Pfeffer 1982; Robins 1987; Maitland, Bryson, and Van de Ven
1985). The central unit of analysis in the perspective is a transaction or
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transfer of resources (e.g., goods, services, funds) between two actors.
Partners in transactions are assumed to try to minimize costs associated
with exchanges that are above and beyond the costs of producing the
goods or services exchanged (Maitland, Bryson, and Van de Ven 1985;
Robins 1987). Such costs are termed transaction costs and organizations
or individuals attempting to conduct transactions typically incur various
types of transaction costs (Williamson 1975; Jones and Pustay 1985). For
instance, negotiating costs are incurred in reaching an initial agreement
on the terms of exchange, often expressed in a contract, and there may
be monitoring costs as each party attempts to ensure that the other is
keeping the terms of the agreement.
Mechanisms to govern or mediate transactions are important in the
transaction cost perspective. Coase (1937) argued that transactions can be
governed by markets in which competition among actors increases the
likelihood that the value of goods or services will be reflected in their
price. In other words, markets can serve to reduce transaction costs.
Coase also recognized that transactions can be efficiently regulated within
firms when hierarchies are established to specify the terms of exchange
among actors.
In Williamson% view (1975; 1979; 1981), markets fail to govern trans-
actions efficiently when one of several conditions obtains: markets are not
competitive (e.g., they are dominated by a few firms); actors behave
opportunistically; there is uncertainty about exchanges; or there is bounded
rationality or limits on actors’ ability to process information (March and
Simon 1958).
Williamson (1979) argues that markets are not competitive, not only
because of conditions such as monopoly or oligopoly but also, because
organizations develop transaction-specific investments in one another. For
example, a supplier of pharmaceutical supplies may have a history of
transactions with a hospital and, as a result, may develop special knowl-
edge of the needs of the medical staff. In this case, the supplier may have
an advantage over other firms, thus reducing the competitive nature of
the market.
To the extent that such conditions characterize markets, it is difficult
to write contracts that adequately and efficiently specify the obligations
of each party. Organizations that find themselves in noncompetitive mar-
kets seek vertical integration, merger, or other means to establish hier-
archies to minimize transaction costs.
It is important to point out that the transaction cost and resource
dependence perspectives are not as incompatible as they might initially
appear or as their proponents have sometimes claimed (Williamson and
Ouchi 1981). Both perspectives are variants of exchange theory; they take
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as their central unit of analysis an exchange of resources of a transaction
between two or more actors. Resource dependence theorists see managers
as motivated to maintain autonomy or power relative to their exchange
partners. Transaction cost theorists see managers as motivated to make
transactions as efficient as possible by minimizing transaction costs.
. 
Stinchcombe (1985) has recently argued that an organization can,
and often does, use contracts to establish a limited hierarchy over another
firm. For example, contracts are written that grant a buyer the right to
inspect carefully and, if necessary, to change the production processes of
the supplier of an important product. The critical point of Stinchcombe
analysis is that we ought not draw simple dichotomies between markets
and hierarchies.
Similarly, we believe that federations, in many instances, occupy a
middle ground between markets and hierarchies. That is, federations are
similar to hierarchies in that they establish a means to regulate trans-
actions among organizations. Certainly, many federations do not have the
authority to impose rules on members as do hierarchical organizations,
but most federations do develop mechanisms to coordinate transactions
among organizations, and such mechanisms have the potential to reduce
the transaction costs of member organizations.
Thus, a transaction cost perspective on federations suggests that:
Hypothesis 6: Hospitals are likely to form federations to the extent
that federations can mediate transactions among their members more
efficiently than either markets or hierarchies.
A key question is, under what circumstances can hospital federa-
tions reduce transaction costs for their members relative to markets or
hierarchies? First, of course, the potential members of a hospital federa-
tion must have some relationships that generate transaction costs; there
must be costs involved in interhospital relationships. Transaction costs
could arise, for example, from the transfer of patients, arrangements for
medical student residencies and internships, joint use of medical tech-
nology, and overlapping medical staff membership.
Second, for a federation to emerge, the costs of cooperation must be
less than the costs of competition or of maintaining the status quo in
relationships (Jones and Pustay 1985). Several factors can increase the
costs of cooperation and thus make it less likely that federations will form.
The costs of cooperation may increase as the number of interacting
organizations increases, making it more difficult to negotiate, monitor,
and enforce agreements. Similarly, when the environment of cooperating
organizations is changing and uncertain, they will have to develop more
complicated terms of agreement. The costs of cooperation increase as the
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extent of interaction among parties increases; high levels of interaction
change the balance of power and dependency, further complicating the
problem of reaching agreements. In short, the likelihood that organiza-
tions will form federations increases to the extent that they develop mech-
anisms to reduce the transaction costs associated with cooperation.
Previous work suggests two possible means of reducing the trans-
action costs of cooperation. First, to the extent that the management group
of a federation can bear the costs of negotiating and monitoring interor-
ganizational agreements, organizations can shift the costs of cooperation
from themselves to others and thereby make federations less costly (Jones
and Pustay 1985). In fact, in the early development of several hospital
federations, members of the management group have spent much of their
time building consensus among organizations concerning the purposes
and programs of the federation. But, of course, organizations are often
reluctant to invest authority in such management bodies.
Second, the transaction costs associated with cooperation can be
significantly reduced to the extent that managers share a common set of
values and goals, forming a &dquo;clan.&dquo; Ouchi (1980) has argued that clans
contribute to efficiency because they create a perception of equity among
actors. Actors more readily enter into agreements when they perceive
that, at least in the long run, they will be treated equitably. In turn, the
likelihood that managers of independent organizations will come to such
shared understandings probably rests on several factors including their
previous interaction, if any, with one another, their prior experience in
federations or coalitions, the opportunities that exist for them to interact
outside their respective organizations (e.g., in professional organizations)
and, finally, values they may share about important issues (Stevenson,
Pearce, and Porter 1985). For example, the president of a newly formed
federation of Catholic hospitals asserted that the federation is more uni-
fied than most because it has &dquo;a very strong Catholic heritage and Catholic
tradition&dquo; (Anderson 1987, 42).
In sum: .
Hypothesis 7: Hospital federations are more likely to emerge when
the transaction costs involved in cooperation are reduced for poten-
tial members by management groups or by shared values and goals.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that there are relatively few fed-
erations such as the one in Rochester in which the member hospitals are
in close proximity to one another and interact with one another routinely.
This does not imply that there are no transaction costs among neighboring
hospitals, or that they do not seek to minimize such costs, or that fed-
erations are not themselves cost-effective. We expect that as resources in
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the field of health care continue to be limited, hospital managers will put
more emphasis on increasing organizational efficiency; this may include
seeking to reduce interhospital transaction costs in federations.
AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
’ON FEDERATIONS
Several theorists have developed what is termed an institutional
perspective on organization-environment relations (Meyer and Rowan
1977; Zucker 1977; 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Tolbert 1985; Meyer
and Scott 1983; Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Rowan 1982). This perspective
focuses attention on the beliefs, norms, and rules that characterize the
social context in which organizations are embedded. Normative under-
standings or expectations of organizations that are widely shared are
termed the institutional environment.
In modem societies, organizations are typified as systems of ration-
ally ordered rules and activities (Weber 1947). In turn, because organi-
zations are expected to behave rationally, their policies and practices are
readily accepted and institutionalized (Zucker 1977; Meyer and Rowan
1977; Meyer and Scott 1983; Tolbert 1985). The policies and practices of
organizations have become widely acknowledged as appropriate means
to achieve goals.
As a consequence, organizations experience pressure to conform to
common understandings of effective and efficient structure and behavior.
Violating such expectations may call an organizations legitimacy into
question and thus affect its ability to obtain resources and societal sup-
port. Indeed, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977)
have argued that the pressure to conform to institutional norms is even
greater for organizations such as hospitals whose output is difficult to
measure. The institutional environment of organizations defines for them
what-is appropriate structure and behavior.
The institutional perspective seems to have in common with the
resource dependence perspective an important point: both view legiti-
macy from the environment as a key for organizational effectiveness and
survival. In the resource dependence perspective, legitimacy is viewed
as a resource that organizations obtain and exchange for material re-
sources such as funds and personnel (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). From an
institutional perspective, organizations gain legitimacy through iso-
morphism with the environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), i.e., by
conforming to commonly accepted structures and procedures. In this
view, the importance of federations lies not so much in their ability to
help organizations solve technical problems (e.g., improve efficiency) but
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rather in their ability to enable organizations to enhance their legitimacy
(Ritti and Silver 1986).
Moreover, some theorists have emphasized the role of institutional
norms and values in shaping the responses of organizations to resource
dependence problems. In other words, institutional environments define
for organizations a set of informal, and sometimes formal, rules by which
to compete for resources.
A recent study by Tolbert (1985) nicely illustrates this point, hy-
pothesizing that universities will create special administrative positions
to manage dependence on important sources of funding only when such
dependencies do not fit traditional patterns of dependency-when such
dependencies are not the norm for universities. For example, public uni-
versities have long been dependent on public sources of funding such as
state appropriations. For them, dependence on public funds is institu-
tionalized, and they do not need to create additional administrative po-
sitions to manage their dependency. On the other hand, when universities
develop dependencies on atypical sources of funds (e.g., a private college
depends heavily on government contracts), they are likely to manage the
dependency by creating additional positions. The data supported Tolberts
hypotheses and suggest that organizations’ responses to resource depen-
dence are conditioned by institutional norms.
It follows from an institutional perspective that:
Hypothesis 8: Hospitals are more likely to form federations to the
extent that doing so conforms to widely held expectations and beliefs.
There are several reasons to believe that hospitals may be experi-
encing pressure to form federations or similar multiorganizational ar-
rangements. First, in the field of health and human services, collaboration
among organizations has long been viewed as beneficial for community
and societal needs. Indeed, interorganizational collaboration is sometimes
mandated by law in the field of health care, while in other industries
collaboration is viewed as a violation of antitrust regulations.
Second, the members of one of the initial federations, VHA, are
widely considered to be among the most prominent and respected hos-
pitals in the nation. The behavior of respected opinion leaders sends
powerful messages to others in the field.
Third, norms encouraging multihospital arrangements are likely to
have been developed by hospitals that merged to form multihospital sys-
tems. Such systems differ from federations in that the members lose their
- status as independent firms, but the widespread emergence of hospital
systems is one of the most significant trends in the industry in the past
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several years (Ermann and Gabel 1984). Hospital federations may be a
form of mimicry of multihospital systems (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Finally, there exist in the hospital industry several conduits for the
diffusion of norms about federations. Managers have many opportunities
for social interaction, and established social networks facilitate the dif-
fusion of information and norms (Marrett 1980; DiMaggio and Powell
1983). Thus, managers whose organizations form federations may be both
enhancing the legitimacy of their hospitals and creating norms for other
managers in the field. Perhaps a snowball effect is being created in the
hospital industry. As an increasing number of not-for-profit hospitals
form federations, it may become widely accepted that federations are use-
ful, and even necessary, vehicles to compete with for-profit hospital cor-
porations and other not-for-profit hospitals. Managers who do not respond
to changes in their environment by forming a federation or engaging in
similar strategies may violate a norm that implies a multiorganizational
response to the environment is necessary.
In sum:
Hypothesis 9: Institutional norms exist to support the emergence of
hospital. federations as a result of historical emphasis on collabora-
tion, examples set by opinion leaders, and a desire to mimic large
multihospital systems.
Finally, the institutional perspective emphasizes aspects of mana-
gerial motivation and behavior different from the other approaches con-
sidered thus far. The resource dependence and transaction cost perspectives
emphasize the cognitive aspects of managerial behavior: managers are
information processors and strategic decision makers who have knowl-
edge of their organizations’ transactions and respond to reduce ineffi-
ciency or dependence. In contrast, the institutional perspective, at least
implicitly, presents managers as individuals who are concerned with ap-
prehending and conforming to the norms and beliefs of other managers
and groups in their environment. In this view, managers need to know
and contribute to the symbols and rituals of the culture in which their
organizations are embedded. Managers must manipulate impressions and
the symbols of rational behavior.
THE POPULATION ECOLOGY
OF FEDERATIONS
The population ecology perspective, drawing heavily from biological
concepts and principles, argues that the behavior of organizations is largely
determined by their environments (Hannan and Freeman 1977; 1984;
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Aldrich 1979; McKelvey 1982; McKelvey and Aldrich 1983). The perspec-
tive focuses not on individual organizations but rather on organizational
forms or populations of organizations. Further, the perspective is pri-
marily concerned with the evolutionary development, including birth and
death, of forms of organizations.
A key premise of the population ecology perspective is that indi-
vidual organizations are subject to strong inertial forces and rarely suc-
ceed in making substantial changes in strategy and structure in response
to environmental threats (Hannan and Freeman 1984). As a consequence,
organizational adaptation to the environment occurs principally at the
population level, as one form of organization replaces another. The term
&dquo;organizational form,&dquo; though variously defined (see Pfeffer, 1982, 181),
generally refers to the structures and processes that characterize individ-
ual organizations (Ulrich and Barney 1984).
. 
Of course, an important assumption is that individual organizations
can be classified into populations based on common organizational forms
(McKelvey 1982). Once population characteristics are identified, the re-
lationship between environments and the survival and death of organi-
zational forms can be examined. For example, Hannan and Freeman (1977)
have hypothesized that generalist organizations (e.g., those that engage
in a number of diverse activities) can survive over a wider range of
environmental conditions than specialist organizations.
In short, from the population ecology perspective, organizations
operate in environments that provide them with resources necessary for
growth and survival. But resources often are limited, and organizations
must compete with each other for survival. Those organizations best
suited to their environments are selected for survival, while others are
selected against and disappear.
From a population ecology perspective, the emergence of federations
does not necessarily or typically involve changes in the core features of
hospitals. Core features such as the goals, authority structure, and tech-
nologies of hospitals appear to remain the same as hospitals form fed-
erations. This is consistent with the assumption that organizations are
subject to strong inertial forces, or:
Hypothesis 10: Hospitals are less likely to form federations to the
extent that they are required to change their core features to do so.
Further, Hannan and Freeman (1984) have argued that, on the av-
erage, structural inertia increases with the age of an organization and
perhaps with its size. Older and larger organizations have relatively more
difficulty in changing core features than younger and smaller organiza-
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tions. As a result, they may be less likely to join, or certainly to change
themselves substantially to remain members of, federations.
The population ecology perspective, similar to the institutional per-
spective, also considers the possibility that federations may be part of a
transformation of the population of hospitals, a transformation in which
the predominant form of organization will be multihospital arrange-
ments. Indeed, one could argue that federations are a mechanism that will
work in conjunction with environmental forces to select hospitals for
long-term survival. In other words, a hospitals chances for survival could
be improved by membership in a federation in part because such mem-
bership may yield material benefits and legitimacy and, in part, because
federations will select only effective and efficient hospitals as members.
In short, federations may both help the strong get stronger and reduce
threats from the environment.
Moreover, given the turbulent environment hospitals face, large
generalist federations may be more likely to survive over time than either
freestanding hospitals or specialist federations (see Hannan and Freeman
1977). Federations that survive will engage in a wide range of activities
and programs with a large number of members, increasing access to the
resources hospitals need to perform effectively in competitive environ-
ments (Alexander, Kaluzny, and Middleton 1986, Kaluzny et al. 1987).
The foregoing arguments suggest:
Hypothesis 11: Federations are more likely to emerge among rela-
tively large, efficient, and effective hospitals.
However, we ought to recognize that population ecology makes no
claims that transformations in a population of organizations guarantee
the organizations’ effectiveness or survival. On the contrary, Hannan and
Freeman (1984, 150) argue cogently that innovation (i.e., the creation of
new strategies and structures) &dquo;is random with respect to adaptive value.&dquo;
Stinchcombe (1965) hypothesized that organizations encounter a &dquo;liability
of newness,&dquo; a heightened chance for organizational death when they are
first formed and have not yet been able to secure sufficient environmental
support to survive competition. There is now a growing body of empirical
support for this position (Carroll and Delacroix 1982; Freeman, Carroll,
and Hannan 1983; Carroll 1983; Singh, House, and Tucker 1986). Simi-
larly, organizations also may face a greater chance for death during times
of significant reorganization, since such reorganizations entail mustering
a new set of resources. Indeed, Hannan and Freeman assert that envi-
ronmental selection tends to favor organizations whose structures are




Organizations and their managers seem to be motivated by multiple
concerns in relation to their environments, including concerns to: main-
tain autonomy from groups in their environment; increase efficiency in
relations with other organizations; learn and conform to institutional
norms; and survive in competitive circumstances despite difficulties in
adapting organizational strategies and structures to changing demands.
Indeed, it is possible that several of the factors hypothesized to
influence the emergence of hospital federations could be working simul-
taneously. For example, hospitals could be motivated to form federations
not only to manage resource dependence problems but also to improve
their efficiency in relations with other hospitals. In other words, in many
cases, the hypotheses advanced above are not mutually exclusive.
At the same time, however, it seems that there are some instances
in which certain hypotheses could be viewed as competing rather than
complementary. For example, suppose that several hospitals form a fed-
eration to oppose proposed changes in state legislation concerning Med-
icaid payments; this behavior could be accounted for from a resource
dependence perspective (see hypotheses 1 through 4). Suppose further
that the federation increased transaction costs among the hospitals, thus
failing to support Hypothesis 6. In this example, the hospitals’ need to
manage a resource dependence problem outweighs the costs incurred in
cooperating. 
’
Further, suppose that the chances for survival of a particular hospital
could be improved substantially by joining a federation that would offer
access to needed capital, technology, and management services, but, to
join the federation, the hospital would need to change significantly its
structure and operations. In this example, hypotheses from a population
ecology perspective may be at odds with hypotheses from a resource
dependence perspective. In our view, these two brief illustrations indicate
the need for further integration of the hypotheses and conceptual per-
spectives introduced above (see also Ulrich and Barney 1984).
One point of integration is to recognize that the importance of re-
sources (e.g., information, funds, personnel, legitimacy, technology) is
likely to vary over time depending on an organizations stage in the or-
ganizational life cycle (Kimberly and Miles 1980). Resources such as le-
gitimacy, for example, may be more important for effectiveness and
survival in the early stages of an organizations life cycle. In fact, in a
recent study of social service organizations, Singh, House, and Tucker
(1986) showed that lack of institutional support is an important reason
why many organizations die early in their existence.
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In contrast, in the middle stages of an organizations life cycle, it
may be more important to increase the efficient use of resources, as sug-
gested by the transaction cost perspective (Quinn and Cameron 1983).
Similarly, the ability of hospitals to change their core features to form or
join federations is likely to vary with their stage in the organizational life
,cycle. As noted above, Hannan and Freeman (1984) have argued that
significant organizational changes are less likely as organizations increase
in age.
These arguments suggest that one way to reconcile potentially com-
peting hypotheses concerning the emergence of hospital federations is to
take into account the organizational life cycle of hospitals. The factors that
influence hospitals to form federations may vary depending on hospitals’
needs for particular resources which, in turn, will be a function of their
stage in the organizational life cycle.
This article has developed a set of research questions for theorists
and policy makers concerned with the collaborative strategies of hospi-
tals. We identified for analysis several characteristics of organizations and
their environments. Perhaps, as McKelvey and Aldrich (1983) suggest,
typologies or profiles can be developed of organizations that participate
in federations and those that do not. Such typologies can include profiles
of the organizations’ environments.
Clearly, the hypotheses advanced above call for longitudinal re-
search. We need descriptive research on the development of federations
over time to begin to address key questions concerning their behavior.
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